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Abstract 
This paper studies the effects of managerial delegation in a duopoly game under 
alternative unionization structures. Introducing managerial delegation in a 
framework with centralized unionization leads to incentives for sales, lower 
profits and higher consumer surplus as well as overall welfare. By contrast, 
delegating output decisions to managers in the presence of decentralized 
unionization produces opposite results unless unions are strongly employment-
oriented. Moreover, managerial delegation makes unionization structure neutral 
in relation to consumer surplus and overall efficiency. Finally, the timing of 
moves in the three-stage game proves to be important for obtaining the above 
qualitative results under decentralized unionization. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Since the seminal work by Berle and Means (1932), corporate governance literature evidenced that, 
at least in large companies, ownership and management are separated and agency issues are 
widespread (e.g. Fama and Jensen 1983). For instance, starting from Baumol (1958), several works 
highlighted that managers may be driven by other motives than pure profit-maximization, such as 
sales-maximization, and this implies that firms’ owners must rely on managerial incentive contracts 
in order to align managers’ goals with their own.1 
The strategic use of incentive contracts in oligopolistic product markets where decisions are 
delegated to managers has been introduced in the literature by the pioneering works by Vickers 
(1985), Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) (VFJS from here 
onwards). Accordingly, each owner has the opportunity to compensate his/her manager with a 
bonus based on a weighted sum of objective performance measures, such as profits or sales (“sales 
delegation”), in order to drive the manager to a more aggressive behaviour in the market and, as a 
consequence, to force the rival firm to reduce output. Typically, a two-stage game is analyzed into 
this framework: at the first stage, the owners of each firm simultaneously determine the incentive 
structure for their managers; at the second stage, the competing managers play an oligopoly game, 
with each firm’s manager knowing his incentive contract and those of competing managers. 
Another important feature characterizing labour markets is that they are often unionized. 
However, in this respect, there exist substantial differences between countries. Specifically, a salient 
dimension that differentiates national unionization structures is the degree of wage setting 
centralization (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988; Freeman, 1988; Layard and Nickell, 1999; Flanagan, 
1999). At the industry level, a decentralized wage setting structure, involving firm-specific unions, 
is commonly contrasted with a completely centralized one, in which a single industry union sets a 
standard wage for the entire industry. Particularly, while centralized unions representing all workers 
in an industry are widespread in Continental Europe, firm-specific unions and decentralized wage 
setting are largely predominant in UK, North America and Japan (e.g. Flanagan, 1999). 
                                                
1 Also the empirical evidence (see e.g. Jensen and Murphy, 1990) confirms that owners try to motivate their 
managers through compensation contracts aiming to gain a competitive advantage in the market. 
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In industrial organization theory, the prominent role played by unions has been recently 
recognized by the growing literature on unionized oligopolies (see e.g. Horn and Wolinsky, 1988; 
Dowrick, 1989; Naylor, 1999; Correa-López and Naylor, 2004; Correa-López, 2007; Lommerud et 
al., 2005; Pal and Saha, 2008). Such models also incorporate two stages of decisions: at stage 1, 
wages are unilaterally set by monopoly unions or are bargained between firms and unions,2 while, 
at stage 2, (given wages) each firm decides its optimal (profit-maximizing) output (or price), which 
also implies its labour demand. 
Motivated by the importance of managerial delegation issues and institutional diversity of 
industry unionization in market economies, this paper analyzes how unionization structures that 
differ in the degree of wage centralization affect managerial incentive contracts and product market 
outcomes. Indeed, despite the widespread inclusion of managerial incentive contracts à la VFJS in 
the oligopoly literature, as well as the recent increasing attention paid to unionized oligopolies, a 
relatively lower consideration has been devoted to the interaction between the structure of labour 
unions and the choice of managerial delegation by firms.3 
Notable exceptions are Szymanski (1994) and Bughin (1995).4 In particular, Szymanski 
(1994) extends the VFJS model by introducing wage bargaining between firms’ owners and firm-
                                                
2 In this paper we concentrate on the monopoly union case (in the concluding section we outline some 
considerations on extending our results to a model with wage bargaining). In the literature on unionized 
oligopolies, the monopoly union model is widely adopted (see e.g. Brekke, 2004; Haucap and Wey, 2004; 
Lommerud et al., 2005). 
3 Recent contributions in the unionized oligopolies literature analyze the role of unionization structure 
(decentralized vs. centralized) in affecting innovation incentives (Haucap and Wey, 2004; Mukherjee and 
Pennings, 2011), incentives for foreign direct investment (Mukherjee and Zhao, 2007; Mukherjee and 
Suetrong, 2012) and welfare effects of downstream mergers (Brekke, 2004; Symeonidis, 2010). 
4 More recently, some works deal with a related, but different issue, namely strategic delegation in wage 
bargaining. Particularly, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2006) consider the possibility that surplus-
maximizing unions delegate the wage bargaining to wage-maximizing delegates (such as senior union 
members) and analyze how this possibility affects the incentives for mergers by firms’ owners. Liao (2010), 
instead, investigates the choice of a firm’s delegate (either the owner or the manager) in bargaining wages 
and employment with a union under a unionized duopoly. 
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specific unions, showing that owners set incentives closer to profit maximization than to sales 
maximization and that increasing union power may raise profitability of the firm. Instead, Bughin 
(1995) considers a two-stage game, in which, at the first stage, wages are bargained between firms 
and unions assuming that they have identical bargaining powers and, at the second stage, output 
decisions are made cooperatively by the owner (who maximizes profits) and the manager (who 
maximizes sales). However, Szymanski (1994) as well as Bughin (1995) focus exclusively on 
decentralized modes of wage setting, where wages are set by independent unions at the firm-level, 
hence the relative performance of more centralized wage setting systems remains an open issue, 
even though, as above discussed, the degree of wage centralization has been identified as a crucial 
feature of different unionization structures.5 
In this paper we study a framework, which is partly similar to that considered in Szymanski 
(1994), with the aim of investigating the interaction between managerial delegation and the 
presence of labour union(s), which can be either firm-specific or industry-wide. In particular, we 
analyze a non-cooperative three-stage game: at the first stage, in accordance with the standard 
VFJS approach, owners simultaneously choose an incentive contract for their managers; at the 
second stage, unions fix wages; finally, at the third stage, managers compete à la Cournot in the 
product market by simultaneously choosing outputs for given wages and incentive contracts. 
Particularly, by considering as results differ according to the nature, decentralized and 
centralized, of labour unions, we aim to assess the relative performance of different unionization 
structures via their impact on managerial incentive contracts. Moreover, while Szymanski (1994) 
and Bughin (1995) do not deal with welfare issues, we also derive results as regards consumer 
surplus and overall welfare. Specifically, we aim to address the following questions: how does the 
structure of unions modify the choice of the optimal manager’s incentive for sales? And how this 
reflects on equilibrium profits, consumer surplus and overall welfare? Such issues are obviously 
relevant to the concerns of labour economics and industrial organization. 
Our main results can be summarized as follows. Firstly, while firms’ owners put a positive 
weight on sales under centralized unionization, sales are even “penalized” when unions are firm-
                                                
5 Indeed, Szymanski himself recognizes that analyzing the role of industry wide bargaining union is an 
important issue that deserves to be further investigated (Szymanski 1994, p. 114). 
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specific. Particularly, this latter result applies unless unions are not distinctly oriented towards 
employment. 
Secondly, the role of managerial delegation in affecting product market and welfare 
outcomes proves to be dramatically different according to the unionization structure. In particular, 
while, in line with VFJS (where unions are not involved), introducing managerial delegation under 
a centralized union structure reduces profits and increases output, consumer surplus and overall 
welfare,6 the opposite generally holds true with decentralized unions. Most strikingly, while without 
managerial delegation social welfare is higher under decentralized unions, introducing it makes 
unionization structure neutral in relation to overall efficiency, that is, social welfare becomes the 
same under decentralized and centralized union structures. At the same time, under managerial 
delegation, the union structure importantly affects the relative positions of the different actors 
involved (i.e. it produces important distributional effects). 
Finally, while we derive the above results in a framework à la Szymanski (1994), where 
firms’ owners define managerial contracts before unions set wages, we also show that, when unions 
play instead a leader position in the game, more traditional results are generally restored even for 
the case with decentralized unionization:7 managerial delegation makes consumers and society as a 
whole better off while, regarding firms’ owners, it decreases profits but only if (firm-specific) 
unions are not sufficiently wage-oriented. 
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the basic 
framework and recall the results of the (VFJS) benchmark case of managerial delegation without 
unions. In Section 3, unions are introduced into the analysis and we derive equilibrium outcomes of 
the three-stage game with both decentralized (firm-specific) and centralized (wide-industry) 
union(s). In Section 4, by comparing the outcomes obtained in the previous section, we derive and 
                                                
6 In relation to the standard (without unions) managerial delegation framework Fershtmann and Judd (1987, 
pp. 932-933), for instance, point out that “total output in the incentive equilibrium always exceeds Cournot 
output, and profits and prices are lower […]. Since output is increased and oligopoly rents are lower, 
efficiency is improved”. 
7 In the concluding section we discuss which factors can affect the sequence of moves in the three-stage 
game. 
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discuss the paper’s main results. In Section 5, we modify the basic framework by considering an 
alternative scenario in relation to the timing of the game. Finally, Section 6 concludes with further 
comments, while in the final Appendix the derivation of other results used for comparisons in 
Section 4 and more technical proofs are provided. 
 
 
2 The basic framework 
 
We adopt a managerial delegation basic framework, which is partially modelled along the lines of 
Jansen et al. (2007, 2009) and van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007), where we introduce the presence of 
labour unions in determining workers’ wages. In particular, we consider a normalized duopolistic 
Cournot market for a single homogenous product, with inverse demand given by: 
 
! 
p =1"Q           [1] 
 
where p denotes price and Q is the sum of the firms’ output levels (Q = q1 + q2).8 
We assume that both firms produce according to a standard production function with 
constant returns to labour ii Lq = , where iL  represents the level of employment of firm i. The firm i 
faces a marginal (and average) cost 0!
i
w  for any unit of output produced, where 
i
w  is the per-
worker wage. Therefore, the firm i ’s cost function is linear and described by: 
 
! 
Ci(qi) = wi Li = wi qi .          [2] 
 
For each firm, the cost of producing one output unit equals wi < 1 and we assume that wages 
are monopolistically chosen by union(s) (see Section 3). 
We also admit that the owners of both firms hire a manager and delegate the output decision 
to this manager. Each manager receives a fixed salary plus a bonus element, which is related to a 
                                                
8 Notice that the standard inverse demand p' = a – bQ' can be obtained from this normalized model simply 
by fixing p = p'/a and Q = (b/a)Q'. 
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weighted combination between firms’ profits and sales. More specifically, following Jansen et al. 
(2007, 2009), if the firm i’s profits 
! 
"
i
 are positive – otherwise there is no bonus – manager i 
receives a bonus that is proportional to 
! 
ui = " i + biqi , where the weight bi is chosen by the owner i 
to maximize profits and can be either positive or negative according to the fact that the owner 
provides incentives or disincentives to the manager’s choice of output (sales).9 
Figure 1 provides the timing of events and, in what follows, we proceed into the analysis 
according to the standard backward logic. 
 
Figure 1. Timing of events 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given that 
! 
" i = (1# wi #Q)qi, ui (which drives the manager i’s utility) can be rewritten as: 
 
! 
ui = " i + biqi = (1# wi #Q+ bi)qi         [3] 
 
hence, the equilibrium of the third stage of the game (the market game) must satisfy: 
 
! 
"ui
"qi
= 0#1$ wi $ 2qi $ q j + bi = 0 .        [4] 
                                                
9 We also follow the standard assumption by managerial delegation theory that the fixed component (salary) 
of the manager pay is chosen by the firm’s owner such that the manager exactly gets his/her opportunity cost, 
which is normalized to zero. 
Owners decide managerial 
incentive contracts 
(choose b) 
Wages w are set 
by union(s) 
Managers 
choose output q 
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 
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for i, j = 1, 2 and i ≠ j. According to (4), firms’ reaction functions are: 
 
! 
qi(q j ) =
1" wi " q j + bi
2
         [5] 
 
and from equation [5], by substituting for the corresponding of firm j, we get the equilibrium output 
by firm i, for given wi, wj, bi and bj: 
 
! 
qi(wi,w j ,bi,b j ) =
1+ 2bi " b j " 2wi + w j
3
.       [6] 
 
2.1 A benchmark case: managerial delegation without unions 
 
For following comparisons and discussion, it can be useful to derive, in our framework, equilibrium 
outcomes with managerial delegation without unions (that is, VFJS standard results). In this respect, 
we can start from equation [6] taking into account that the (reservation) wage paid by firms to 
employees in the absence of unions is zero (i.e. wi = wj = 0). This leads to the firm i’s profits as 
given by: 
 
! 
" i(bi,b j ) =
(bi + b j #1)(b j # 2bi #1)
9
.        [7] 
 
Maximizing [7] with respect to bi drives to the following reaction function in bonuses space: 
 
! 
bi(b j ) =
1" bj
4
           [8] 
 
which, in turn, leads to the following (symmetric) equilibrium value for b (where the subscript MD 
refers to the “managerial delegation without unions” case): 
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! 
b
MD
= 0.2 .           [9] 
 
As well known from the received literature, it is optimal for firms’ owners to twist their 
manager’s incentives away from strict profit maximization toward sales incentives. Furthermore, it 
also leads to the equilibrium results as reported in the following table. 
 
Table 1. Equilibrium outcomes: managerial delegation vs. profit-maximizing firms 
Outcomes 
Managerial 
delegation 
Profit-maximizing 
firms 
q 0.4 0.3333 
π 0.08 0.1111 
CS 0.32 0.2222 
SW 0.48 0.4444 
 
 
In particular, in Table 1 the equilibrium results with managerial delegation are compared 
against those related to the textbook framework of profit-maximizing firms (i.e. where no 
managerial delegation and unions issues are considered),10 confirming that shifting from profit-
maximizing firms to managerial delegation reduces profits but increases both consumer surplus and 
overall welfare (see e.g. Fershtmann and Judd, 1987). 
 
3 Unions 
 
3.1 Decentralized (firm-specific) unions 
 
In the presence of labour unions, the latter set wages at the second stage of the game (see Figure 1). 
Particularly, we assume monopoly unions which have preferences weighted on wage and 
                                                
10 Such results can be easily obtained by standard analysis by imposing wi = wj = bi = bj = 0. 
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employment, distinguishing between two possible different cases: i) there are two decentralized or 
firm-specific (symmetric) unions which simultaneously fix wages for their own workers; or ii) there 
is a single industry-wide union that fixes a single wage for all workers in the industry. We begin our 
analysis with the first case. The utility of the firm i’s union is given by the following general Stone-
Geary utility function: 
 
! 
Vi = wi
"
Li
1#"
= wi
"
qi
1#"           [11] 
 
where θ ∈ (0,1) is the relative weight placed by unions on wages with respect to employment. In 
particular, θ > (<) 0.5 means that unions have preferences relatively more wage-oriented 
(employment-oriented), while θ = 0.5 refers to the special case of total wage-bill maximization. 
Unions maximize their objective functions with respect to wages, taking managers’ output 
decision into account. Substituting [6] in [11] and maximizing with respect to wi, we get: 
 
! 
wi(w j ,bi,b j ) =
" 1+ 2bi # b j + w j( )
2
        [12] 
 
which defines the sub-game perfect best-reply function in wages of the union-firm pair i under the 
assumption of a non-cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the product market. Solving the 
system composed by equation [12] and its counterpart for j, we obtain the sub-game perfect 
equilibrium wage, for given weight on sales, bi and bj: 
 
! 
wi(bi,b j ) =
" "(1+ 2bj # bi) + 2(1+ 2bi # b j )[ ]
4 #" 2
.      [13] 
 
By substituting [13] in [6], we get output as a function of the weights on sales only: 
 
! 
qi(bi,b j ) =
2(1"#) #(1+ 2b j " bi) + 2(1+ 2bi " b j )[ ]
3(2 + #)(2 "#)
.      [14] 
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Finally, substituting both 
! 
wi(bi,b j )  (Eq. [13]) and 
! 
qi(bi,b j )  (Eq. [14]) in 
! 
" i = (1# wi #Q)qi 
leads to profits as a function of the weights on sales: 
 
! 
" i(bi,b j ) =
2 # 2(bi $ 2b j $1) $#(5bi $ 4b j +1) + 2(2bi $ b j +1)[ ] # 2(5bi + 2b j $ 6) $ 2#(bi $ 8b j + 5)[ ]
9 4 $# 2( )
2
. [15] 
 
At the first stage, each owner i simultaneously chooses bi, anticipating the profits of each 
possible third and second-stage games as a function of bi and bj, as given by equation [15]. In 
particular, maximizing [15] and solving with respect to bi leads to the following reaction function 
for the owner i: 
 
! 
bi(b j ) =
7" 2 # 20" + 4( ) 2 + " # 2b j (1#")[ ]
2(4 #") 4 # 5" 2 +10"( )
      [16] 
 
and, in symmetric equilibrium (bi = bj = b), we get: 
 
! 
b
MD
D = "
7# 2 " 20# + 4
2 2# 2 "# "10( )
         [17] 
 
where indexes refer to the case with decentralized unions and managerial delegation. 
According to equation [17], the following lemmas can be stated: 
 
Lemma 1. Under decentralized unionization, owners fix a positive (negative) bonus weight on sales 
according to the following rule: 
! 
b
MD
D
>
<
0"#
<
>
# = 0.2164 . 
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Lemma 2. Under decentralized unionization, since 
! 
"b
MD
D
"# < 0  for any θ ∈ (0,1), the bonus 
weight on sales is always decreasing with an increasing degree of unions’ wage orientation θ. 
 
In words, owners will twist their manager’s incentives towards (away from) sales depending 
on whether unions are more or less strongly employment oriented. That is, while when unions are 
wage-oriented or weakly employment oriented it will be optimal for owners to “penalize” sales, the 
reverse holds true when unions are strongly employment oriented. 
By substituting [17] in [13], [14] and [15], we find the following equilibrium outcomes: 
 
! 
w
MD
D
=
3"(4 #")
2(5 # 2")(2 + ")
;   
! 
qMD
D
=
(1"#)(4 "#)
(5 " 2#)(2 + #)
;   
! 
"
MD
D
=
(1#$)(4 #$)(4 +10$ # 5$ 2)
2(5 # 2$)2(2 + $)2
. [18] 
 
Furthermore, the equilibrium results, as defined in [18], also imply the following 
(equilibrium) social outcomes in terms of consumer surplus CS and overall welfare SW:11 
 
! 
CS
MD
D
= 2
(1"#)(4 "#)
(5 " 2#)(2 + #)
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
2
;   
! 
SW
MD
D
=
6(1"#)(4 "#)(2 "# 2 + 2#)
(5 " 2#)2(2 + #)2
.    [19] 
 
3.2 Centralized (industry-wide) union 
 
We consider now the case of a monopoly industry-wide union that chooses a single wage for all 
workers in the industry (wi = wj = w) to maximize:12 
                                                
11 Notice that we use the total wage bill instead of union utility in the welfare function. In this choice we 
follow many others in the literature (see e.g. Brander and Spencer, 1988; Mezzetti and Dinopoulos, 1991; 
Zhao, 2001) and this can be explained by the fact that unions’ members are also final good consumers. 
Alternatively, since in our case the wage bill also corresponds to the union’s rent (reservation wage is 
normalized to zero), the latter can be considered as a part of the producer surplus (Bughin and Vannini, 
1995). In fact, we essentially make such a choice to simplify the analysis a bit. Indeed, our main results 
would be qualitatively the same by using unions’ utility instead of total wage bill in the welfare function. 
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! 
V = w
"
(Li + L j )
1#"
= w
"
(qi + q j )
1#" .        [20] 
 
Substituting [6] and the corresponding equation of firm j (with wi = wj = w) in [20] and 
maximizing with respect to w, we get: 
 
! 
w(bi,b j ) =
"(2 + bi + b j )
2
         [21] 
 
and, by substituting [21] in [6], we obtain output as a function of the weights on sales only: 
 
! 
qi(bi,b j ) =
2 1+ 2bi " b j( ) "# 2 + bi + b j( )
6
.       [22] 
 
Finally, by substituting both [21] and [22] in profits, we obtain: 
 
! 
" i(bi,b j ) =
(1# bi + 2b j ) $ 2 + bi + b j( ) # 2 1# bi # b j( )[ ]
18
.     [23] 
 
By maximizing with respect to bi, we get the following reaction function for the owner i: 
 
! 
bi(b j ) =
2(1" bj ) + #
2
2 + b j( ) "# 4 " b j( )
8 "# 2 + 2#
       [24] 
 
and in symmetric equilibrium, with bi = bj = b, we obtain: 
 
! 
b
MD
C
=
2(1+ " 2 # 2")
(5 # 2")(2 + ")
          [25] 
                                                                                                                                                            
12 Clearly, since there is only one union, we do not need to use an index anymore to denote it. 
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where indexes refer to the case with centralized union and managerial delegation). According to 
equation [25], it is easy to check that the following lemmas apply: 
 
Lemma 3. Under centralized unionization, owners always fix a positive bonus weight on sales. 
 
Lemma 4. Under centralized unionization (in line with what applies under decentralized unions), 
the bonus weight on sales is always decreasing with an increasing degree of unions’ wage 
orientation θ (i.e., 
! 
"b
MD
C
"# < 0  for any θ ∈ (0,1)). 
 
By substituting [25] in [21], [22] and [23], we find the following equilibrium outcomes for 
this case: 
 
! 
w
MD
C
=
3"(4 #")
(5 # 2")(2 + ")
;   
! 
qMD
C
=
(1"#)(4 "#)
(5 " 2#)(2 + #)
;   
! 
"
MD
C
=
(1#$)2(4 #$)
(5 # 2$)2(2 + $)
   [26] 
 
which also imply the following (equilibrium) social outcomes in terms of consumer surplus and 
overall welfare: 
 
! 
CS
MD
C
= 2
(1"#)(4 "#)
(5 " 2#)(2 + #)
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
2
;   
! 
SW
MD
C
=
6(1"#)(4 "#)(2 "# 2 + 2#)
(5 " 2#)2(2 + #)2
.    [27] 
 
 
4 Results 
 
In this section, taking the equilibrium results derived in Section 3 into account, we will establish our 
main results. Furthermore, results of Section 3 will be compared with those obtained in a 
framework with (decentralized and centralized) unions without managerial delegation, that is, the 
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standard unionized duopoly framework where wages are set by unions but output decisions are 
directly taken by firms’ owners to maximize profits (see Appendix A.1 for their formal derivations). 
 
Result 1. Unless unions are strongly employment-oriented, managerial delegation (in contrast with 
what applies in a world without unions) increases profits and reduces output, consumer surplus and 
overall welfare under decentralized unionization. By contrast, managerial delegation (in line with 
what applies in a world without unions) reduces profits and increases output, consumer surplus and 
overall welfare under centralized unionization. 
 
Proof: See Appendix A.2.?
?
Result 2. Unless unions are strongly employment-oriented, managerial delegation is harmful (i.e. it 
decreases both wages and employment) for decentralized unions, but is always advantageous (i.e. it 
increases both wages and employment) for a centralized union. 
 
Proof: See Appendix A.3. 
 
Result 3 (“Irrelevance result”). While without managerial delegation social welfare is higher 
under decentralized unions, introducing it makes unionization structure neutral (irrelevant) in 
relation to overall efficiency (i.e. with managerial delegation, social welfare is the same under 
decentralized and centralized unions), even if firms’ owners (unions) are always better (worse) off 
under a decentralized unions structure (i.e. distributional effects realize according to the union 
structure). 
 
Proof: See Appendix A.4. 
 
In order to provide a clear-cut example of the results stated above, in Table 2 equilibrium 
outcomes with and without managerial delegation under alternative uninionization structures are 
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showed for the special case of total wage-bill maximizing unions, that is, for the case in which 
unions place the same weights on wages and employment (i.e. θ = 0.5). 
 
Table 2. A comparison of equilibrium outcomes with total wage-bill maximizing unions (θ = 0.5) 
Outcomes 
Decentralized unions 
with managerial 
delegation 
Decentralized unions 
without managerial 
delegation 
Centralized unions 
with managerial 
delegation 
Centralized unions 
without managerial 
delegation 
b -0.2125 - 0.05 - 
q 0.175 0.2222 0.175 0.1667 
w 0.2625 0.3333 0.525 0.5 
π 0.0678 0.0494 0.0219 0.0278 
CS 0.0612 0.0988 0.0612 0.0556 
SW 0.2888 0.3457 0.2888 0.2778 
 
 
To sum up, while introducing managerial delegation is preferred from consumers and society 
as a whole if labour unions are centralized, consumers and society are generally (i.e. unless unions 
are strongly employment-oriented) damaged by its introduction when there are firm-specific unions 
that choose their workers’ wages. Moreover, in the latter case, since also wages are harmed from 
delegating the output choice to managers, managerial delegation (provided that sales are penalized) 
can be also used by firms’ owners as an effective instrument to recover profits, which otherwise 
were accrued to workers through unionization. The intuition behind this result is that, while 
choosing a positive weight b makes managers more aggressive as regards quantities (hence, 
employment) and this drives unions to raise wages, by “penalizing” quantities (with a negative b), 
owners can instead put a brake on wage rises (further than on employment), hence leading to higher 
profits. However, this argument only applies if unions are not distinctly oriented towards 
employment since, in such a case, penalizing quantities does not produce any important effect on 
unions’ decision about wages. In turn, this leads, even under decentralized unionization, to the more 
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standard result that, in equilibrium, firms’ owners choose a positive bonus weight on sales. This 
confirms that the main reason why in a decentralized unionization context the reversal of the 
standard result by VFJS is obtained relates to the extent of unions’ “wage aggressiveness”. 
By contrast, with an industry-wide union the advantage for the owner to “tune” the selling-
aggressiveness of his/her own manager in order to menace employment (that is, the possibility for 
the owner to weaken the union’s wage claim) is lost because the union’s centralization prevents the 
inter-union competition, which is the cause of the effectiveness in reducing wage costs and 
increasing profits by delegating output decision to the manager. 
Moreover, while without managerial delegation consumer surplus and overall welfare are 
higher under decentralized unionization because, in this latter case, wages are lower (hence output 
is higher), introducing managerial delegation adds a reversal since sales are rewarded under 
centralized unionization while they are penalized with firm-specific unions. The final outcome is 
that, in the presence of managerial delegation, consumers are completely unaffected by whatever 
unionization structure.13 Therefore, the latter only affects the surplus distribution between owners 
and workers, hence determining a very important result: while with firm-specific unions owners 
obtain a relatively sizable profit gain by delegating the output game to managers, under central 
union the introduction of such a delegation causes a relatively sizable profit loss. 
Clearly, these results also shed some light on the interaction between unions’ structure and 
managerial firms, and could provide some testable implications. Particularly, according to them, 
one would expect that, in the presence of firm-specific unions, managers are generally penalized on 
their sales and it is more likely the diffusion of managerial firms. 
 
 
 
                                                
13 Notice that, when unions are distinctly oriented towards employment, equilibrium wages under alternative 
unionization structures tend to be the same in the presence of managerial delegation (from [18] and [26] it is 
easy to check that 
! 
(w
MD
D
"w
MD
C
)#0  when 
! 
" #0). This contributes to explain why the “irrelevance result” 
applies also for very low values of θ, hence when firms’ owners choose a positive bonus weight on sales 
under both unionization regimes. 
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5 An alternative scenario: move reversal 
 
In this section, we modify the previous framework by assuming that unions move at the first stage 
and firms’ owners at the second stage. In other words, with respect to the timing of events shown in 
Figure 1, t = 1 and t = 2 are reversed. Although the sequence of moves as represented in Figure 1 
reflects what has been generally assumed, starting from Szymanski (1994), in the literature,14 the 
reverse could also apply whenever the choice of wages by the union(s) is a more long-run choice 
and more difficult to reverse than that of the managerial incentive contract by the firms’ owners.15 
In such a different situation, consider that the third stage of the game never changes with 
respect to previous analysis, hence the corresponding results related to the output choice by 
managers still hold true. Consider first the case of decentralized unions. Taking equation [6] into 
account, now at stage 2 owners choose the bonus weights to maximize profits which, in relation to 
firm i, are: 
 
! 
" i(wi,w j ,bi,b j ) =
(1# 2wi + w j # bi # b j )(1# 2wi + w j + 2bi # b j )
9
.    [28] 
 
Maximizing each profit equation and solving simultaneously with respect to bi, we get: 
 
! 
bi(wi,w j ) =
1" 3wi + 2w j
5
.         [29] 
 
Taking [29] into account, substituting [6] in [11] and maximizing with respect to wi, we get 
the optimal choice by the union i at the first stage: 
 
                                                
14 Liao (2010) also follows Szymanski (1994) in adopting such a timing of events, although the issue she 
studies is quite different. 
15 We owe this point, hence the extension of the basic framework that we perform in this section, to an 
anonymous referee. 
 18 
! 
wi(w j ) =
"(1+ 2w j )
3
          [30] 
 
which, in symmetric equilibrium, implies the following equilibrium wage: 
 
! 
w 
MD
D
=
"
3# 2"
.           [31] 
 
Finally, by substituting back, we derive the other equilibrium outcomes for this case: 
 
! 
b 
MD
D
=
3(1"#)
5(3" 2#)
;   
! 
q MD
D
=
6(1"#)
5(3" 2#)
;   
! 
" 
MD
D
=
18(1#$)2
25(3# 2$)2
;   
! 
SW MD
D
=
12(1"#)(9 " 4#)
25(3" 2#)2
. [32] 
 
Consider now the case with centralized unionization. At stage 2 owners choose the bonus 
weights to maximize profits which, in relation to firm i, correspond to [28] with wi = wj = w. Hence, 
the firm i’s owner reaction function with respect to the wage parallels [29] with wi = wj = w (i.e., 
bi(w) = (1 – w)/5). Substituting in [20] and maximizing with respect to w, we get the equilibrium 
wage chosen by the union at the first stage:16 
 
! 
w 
MD
C
= "            [33] 
 
which, by substituting back, leads to the other equilibrium outcomes for this case: 
 
! 
b 
MD
C
=
1"#
5
;   
! 
q MD
C
=
2(1"#)
5
;   
! 
" 
MD
C
=
2(1#$)2
25
;   
! 
SW MD
C
=
4(1"#)(3+ 2#)
25
.  [34] 
                                                
16 Notice that it replicates the union’s choice without managerial delegation, while it is different from the 
wage chosen by the central union under the alternative scenario in relation to the sequence of moves. These 
findings are interesting in relation to the well-know “wage rigidity result” by Dhillon and Petrakis (2002), 
according to which the wage set by a centralized union is independent from product market and institutional 
different features. In fact, our results confirm the wage rigidity result only partly. 
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As it has been done in Section 3, by considering the results derived in this section and 
comparing them against those of the case of unionized duopoly (without managerial delegation), as 
derived in the final Appendix, the following outcomes can be highlighted: 
 
Result 4. When unions move first in the three-stage delegation game, the following results apply: 
 
i) managerial delegation decreases wages when unionization is decentralized, while it 
does not affect them under centralized unionization; 
 
ii) under decentralized unionization, qualitative results of Section 4 (for the case in which 
unions are not excessively employment-oriented) are largely reversed. Particularly, 
managerial delegation increases output (consumer surplus) and overall welfare. 
Furthermore, unless unions are sufficiently wage-oriented, it reduces profits; 
 
iii) under centralized unionization, qualitative results obtained in Section 4 (where union 
moves second in the game), still apply. Particularly, managerial delegation reduces 
profits and increases output (consumer surplus) and overall welfare; 
 
iv) finally, the “irrelevance result” of Section 4 no longer applies. Particularly, similarly to 
the case without managerial delegation, overall welfare is larger under decentralized 
unionization. 
 
Proof: See Appendix A.5. 
 
Differences between the results outlined above and those derived in Section 4 are largely 
due to the outcomes obtained for the bonus weight, in the managerial delegation contract, under 
decentralized unionization. Indeed, while (as discussed in Section 4) firms’ owners generally 
penalize managers for sales when they decide bonus weights before firm-specific unions set wages, 
the more standard outcome that managers are rewarded for sales is restored if the managerial 
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contract is chosen when wages have already been fixed by unions. This makes sense. When unions 
move first, from the firms’ owners viewpoint, the situation is exactly the same than in the 
benchmark “managerial delegation without unions” case, analyzed in Section 2.1: they choose the 
bonus weight by taking marginal production costs (i.e. wages) as given. Hence, for the usual 
reasons explained by VFJS, in equilibrium, the bonus weight on sales is positive, hence managers 
behave more aggressively in the product market. In turn, this leads to higher output, hence 
consumer surplus and overall welfare. However, in relation to profits, notice that (under 
decentralized unionization) wages are lower in the presence of managerial delegation. Thus two 
effects are at odds in such a case. From one hand, the (positive) bonus weight on sales operates in 
reducing profits (this is the standard VFJS effect) while, on the other hand, lower wages tend to 
increase profits with respect to the case without managerial delegation. Since the second (wage 
differential) effect is stronger when the unions’ orientation towards wages is sufficiently high (see 
equation [A21] in the final appendix), profits are higher in the presence of managerial delegation 
only if θ is sufficiently large. 
Moreover, while in the framework of Section 4, the negative bonus weight on sales reduces 
output under decentralized unionization so as to cancel out the positive effect due to a lower wage 
(with respect to the case with an industry-wide union), this clearly does not apply anymore in this 
different scenario since the bonus weight chosen by firms’ owners is positive whatever unionization 
structure. This unambiguously implies that under managerial delegation output (consumer surplus) 
as well as overall welfare are larger under firm-specific unions than centralized unionization, thus 
the “irrelevance result” of Section 4 no longer applies. 
 
 
6 Concluding comments 
 
By developing a non-cooperative three-stage duopoly game with managerial delegation and 
monopolistic unions, we have studied how unionization structures that differ in the degree of wage 
centralization affect managerial incentive contracts and product market outcomes. 
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Our findings show that firms’ owners choose a positive weight on sales under a centralized 
union while, unless unions are not distinctly oriented towards employment, sales are “penalized” 
when unions are firm-specific. In such a case, the role of managerial delegation in affecting product 
market outcomes also proves to be dramatically different according to the nature of the unionization 
structure. Indeed, while in line with the received literature (where unions are not involved) 
introducing managerial delegation reduces profits and increases output, consumer surplus and 
overall welfare under a centralized union structure, the opposite holds true with decentralized 
unions. Finally, and most strikingly, we have established an irrelevance result of unionization 
structure in relation to market efficiency when managerial delegation applies. That is, while without 
managerial delegation social welfare is higher under decentralized unions, when owners delegate 
output decisions to managers it becomes the same notwithstanding the union’s structure. At the 
same time, however, important distributional effects realize according to the nature of unionization. 
Such outcomes have been derived in a framework (commonly adopted by the received 
literature) in which unions set wages after than firms’ owners define managerial contracts. We have 
also considered an alternative scenario where the timing of moves of unions and firms’ owners is 
reversed. In this latter case, we have shown that results related to the decentralized unionization 
case are different. In particular, while on the one hand, the standard outcome that introducing 
managerial delegation enhances consumer surplus and social welfare always applies, on the other 
hand, even profits are higher when unions are sufficiently wage-interested. In other words, in the 
presence of wage-aggressive unions, we get the (non-standard) result that managerial delegation can 
act as a device by firms’ owners to increase profits. 
Which scenario actually applies in relation to the timing of moves by firms’ owners and 
union(s) is essentially an empirical issue. For instance, institutional norms and rules specific to each 
country, which regulate the length of contracts, can play a major role in this direction. Connected 
with this, also notice that such an aspect might be considered ultimately as an issue of exploitation 
of power. This implies that the actual timing of moves could also differ according to the 
unionization structure. Particularly, under centralized unionization, due to the pivotal role played 
by the union (as a common input monopoly supplier), the latter may be actually able to play a 
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leader position in the three-stage game.17 Clearly, different considerations apply under decentralized 
unionization, where firms can take advantage from competition between firm-specific unions. Our 
analysis and results provide further elements that could also be useful for assessing such an issue. 
Future research directed to extend our results can be carried out along possible different 
lines. Particularly, the framework could be extended to deal with other managerial incentive 
structures, such as “relative performance delegation” (see e.g. Salas-Fumás, 1992; Miller and 
Pazgal, 2002).18 Furthermore, different unions-firms hypotheses in determining wages, such as 
right-to-manage or efficient bargaining (e.g. Petrakis and Vlassis, 2000), are worth investigating. 
Notice, however, that in relation to the extension of our results to the right-to-manage hypothesis, 
some preliminary intuitions could arise from this work by recalling that the monopoly union model, 
considered in this paper, represents a special case of the right-to-manage model where the union has 
all the bargaining power. Indeed, we have shown that introducing managerial delegation under an 
industry-wide union produces the same qualitative results in relation to profits and social welfare 
than the standard VFJS model (which corresponds to the case with firms having all bargaining 
power in determining wages). By contrast, with respect to the standard case, qualitative results are 
generally reversed under firm-specific unions. Hence, this suggests that in a more general right-to-
manage model of wage determination, while (qualitative) results that we have obtained with a 
centralized union generally hold true, those referring to the firm-specific unions case apply only if 
unions’ bargaining power vis-à-vis firms is sufficiently large. 
 
 
                                                
17 For instance, in his authoritative article, Davidson (1988) points out that centralized unionization tends to 
be strong, stable organization while multi-employer organizations tend to be unstable. This can be seen as a 
further rationale for the leading position (i.e. first mover) played by a central union with respect to firms’ 
owners. 
18 In Meccheri and Fanti (2012) we compare sales delegation and relative performance delegation in a model 
with centralized unionization. In Fanti and Meccheri (2012), instead, we provide a comparison between 
(absolute) performance-related-pay and relative performance evaluation in a differentiated duopoly with 
institutional features that constraint firms in choosing optimal contracts. 
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Appendix 
 
A.1 Derivation of equilibrium results under unionized duopoly without managerial 
delegation 
 
A.1.1 Decentralized unionization. To derive equilibrium results in a framework with 
decentralized unions without managerial delegation, we can start from equation [6] with bi = bj = 0, 
which, by substituting in [11], leads to the following union i’s utility function: 
 
! 
Vi(wi,w j ) = wi
" 1# 2wi + w j
3
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
1#"
.        [A1] 
 
Maximizing [A.1] with respect to wi leads to the following reaction function for union in 
wages space: 
 
! 
wi(w j ) =
"(1+ w j )
2
          [A2] 
 
which, in turn, leads to the following (symmetric) equilibrium value for the wage, where the 
subscript D refers to the decentralized unions (without managerial delegation) case: 
 
! 
w
D
=
"
2 #"
.           [A3] 
 
Finally, by substituting for [A.3], we get the following equilibrium results for this case: 
 
! 
q
D
=
2(1"#)
3(2 "#)
;   
! 
" D =
4(1#$)2
9(2 #$)2
;   
! 
CS
D
= 2
2(1"#)
3(2 "#)
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
2
;   
! 
SW
D
=
4(1"#)(4 "#)
9(2 "#)2
.  [A4] 
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A.1.2 Centralized unionization. To derive equilibrium results in a framework with centralized 
unions without managerial delegation, we can start from equation [6] (and its counterpart for the 
firm j) with bi = bj = 0 and wi = wj = w, which, by substituting in [20], leads to: 
 
! 
V (w) = w
" 2 # 2w
3
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
1#"
.         [A5] 
 
Maximizing and solving [A5] with respect to w leads the following equilibrium value for the 
wage, where the subscript C refers to the centralized unions (without managerial delegation) case: 
 
! 
w
C
= " .           [A6] 
 
Finally, by substituting for [A6] we get the following equilibrium results for this case: 
 
! 
q
C
=
1"#
3
;   
! 
" C =
1#$( )
2
9
;   
! 
CS
C =
2 1"#( )
2
9
;   
! 
SW
C
=
2(1"#)(2 + #)
9
.   [A7] 
 
A.2 Proof of Result 1 
 
Let’s define with 
! 
"X
D
= X
MD
D
# X
D , where XD refers to a result under decentralized unionization 
without managerial delegation as obtained in Appendix A.1.1. Then, by simple comparisons of 
results in Section 3.1 against those in Appendix A.1.1, it follows that: 
 
! 
"# D =
(1$%)(77% 5 $ 514% 4 +1304% 3 $1760% 2 +1360% $ 224)
18(5 $ 2%)2(2 + %)2(2 $%)2
    [A8] 
! 
"q
D
=
(1#$)(7$ 2 # 20$ + 4)
3(5 # 2$)(2 + $)(2 #$)
        [A9] 
! 
"CS
D
= #
2(1#$)2(7$ 4 + 92$ 3 # 624$ 2 + 944$ #176)
9(5 # 2$)2(2 + $)2(2 #$)2
     [A10] 
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! 
"SW
D
= #
2(1#$)(4 #$)(35$ 4 #170$ 3 +192$ 2 + 40$ #16)
9(5 # 2$)2(2 + $)2(2 #$)2
.    [A11] 
 
Firstly, notice that in relation to 
! 
"q
D , we get that 
! 
"q
D >
<
0# 7$ 2 % 20$ + 4
>
<
0 . In the 
interval 
! 
" # (0,1) , 
! 
7" 2 # 20" + 4  has only one root for 
! 
" = 10 # 6 2( ) /7 = 0.2164  (see also Lemma 
1). Moreover, numerical and graphical analyses (see Figure 2) show that 
! 
"  represents the critical 
value also for the signs of 
! 
"# D , 
! 
"CS
D  and 
! 
"SW
D . More specifically, the following apply: 
 
! 
"# D
>
<
0$%
>
<
% ;  "qD
>
<
0$%
<
>
% ;  "CSD
>
<
0$%
<
>
% ;  "SW D   
>
<
0$%
<
>
% . 
Similarly, let’s define with 
! 
"X
C
= X
MD
C
# X
C , where XC refers to a result under centralized 
unionization without managerial delegation as derived in Appendix A.1.2. Then, by simple 
comparisons of results in Section 3.2 against those in Appendix A.1.2, it follows that: 
 
! 
"# C = $
2(1$%)2(2% 3 $ 6% 2 $ 3% + 7)
9(5 $ 2%)2(2 + %)
        [A12] 
! 
"q
C
=
2(1#$ 3 + 3$ 2 # 3$)
3(5 # 2$)(2 + $)
          [A13] 
! 
"CS
C
=
8(1#$)2(11#$ 4 + $ 3 +12$ 2 # 23$)
9(5 # 2$)2(2 + $)2
       [A14] 
! 
"SW
C
=
4(1#$)(8 # 2$ 5 # 2$ 4 + 37$ 3 # 52$ 2 +11$)
9(5 # 2$)2(2 + $)2
 .     [A15] 
 
Graphical analysis (see Figure 2) confirms that the following apply: 
 
! 
"# D < 0, "qD > 0, "CSD > 0, "SW D > 0, for any $ % (0,1) . 
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Figure 2. Differentials behaviour under alternative unionization structures 
 
Q.E.D. 
 
A.3 Proof of Result 2 
Since employment is equal to output in this context and Result 1 states that 
! 
"q
D >
<
0 if and only if 
! 
"
<
>
" = 0.2164 , while 
! 
"q
C
> 0  for any θ ∈ (0,1), we also get that employment follows those 
patterns of behaviour. Moreover, by simple comparisons of [18] against [A3] and [26] against [A6], 
respectively, we obtain (in what follows, notice that 
! 
"w
D  holds the sign of 
! 
"q
D  as showed in 
Appendix A.2; compare [A16] below with [A9]): 
 
! 
"w
D
= w
MD
D
# w
D
=
$(7$ 2 # 20$ + 4)
2(5 # 2$)(2 + $)(2 #$)
>
<
0%$
<
>
$ = 0.2164     [A16] 
! 
"w
C
= w
MD
C
# w
C
=
2$($ 2 # 2$ +1)
(5 # 2$)(2 + $)
> 0, for any θ ∈ (0,1).     [A17] 
Q.E.D. 
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A.4 Proof of Result 3 
 
First, by comparing SWD against SWC from Appendix A.1 (see [A4] and [A7], respectively), we get: 
 
! 
SW
D
" SW
C
=
2#(1"#)(2 "# 2 + 2#)
9(2 "#)2
> 0 , for any θ ∈ (0,1).    [A18] 
 
Instead, from [19] and [27] of Sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively, it is easy to check that 
! 
SW
MD
D
= SW
MD
C  for any θ ∈ (0,1). Furthermore, the following also apply: 
 
! 
"
MD
D
#"
MD
C
=
3$(4 #$)2(1#$)
2(5 # 2$)2(2 + $)2
> 0 , for any θ ∈ (0,1)     [A19] 
! 
2 wMD
D
qMD
D( ) " wMDC 2qMDC( ) = "
3#(4 "#)2(1"#)
(5 " 2#)2(2 + #)2
< 0, for any θ ∈ (0,1).   [A20] 
Q.E.D. 
 
A.5 Proof of Result 4 
 
i) Let’s define with 
! 
"X 
J
= X 
MD
J
# X
J , where 
! 
X 
MD
J  refers to a result obtained in Section 5 (with 
first moving unions), with 
! 
J = D,C{ } , while XJ refers to a result without managerial delegation. 
Then, by simple comparisons of [31] against [A3] and [33] against [A6], respectively, we obtain: 
 
! 
"w 
D
=
#(# $1)
(3$ 2#)(2 $#)
< 0,  for any # % (0,1)       [A21] 
! 
"w 
C
= 0 .           [A22] 
 
ii) By simple comparisons of the results in Section 5 (for decentralized unionization) against 
those in Appendix A.1.1, it follows that: 
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! 
"# D = $
2(1$%)2(119% 2 $ 276% +126)
225(3$ 2%)2(2 $%)2
       [A23] 
! 
"q 
D
=
2(3#$ 2 # 2$)
15(3# 2$)(2 #$)
         [A24] 
! 
"SW
D
=
4(1#$)(72 # 8$ 3 # 25$ 2 + 21$)
225(3# 2$)2(2 #$)2
.       [A25] 
 
In relation to 
! 
"# D , we get that 
! 
"# D
>
<
0$119% 2 & 276% +126
<
>
0. In the interval 
! 
" # (0,1) , 
! 
119" 2 # 276" +126  has only one root for 
! 
" = 138 # 45 2( ) /119 = 0.6249. In particular, we get that 
! 
"# D
>
<
0$%
>
<
0.6249  (see also Figure 3). Moreover, it is easy to check that, 
! 
"q 
D  (
! 
"CS
D
), 
! 
"SW
D
 
> 0, for any θ ∈ (0,1). 
 
iii) By simple comparisons of the results in Section 5 (for centralized unionization) against 
those in Appendix A.1.2, it follows that: 
 
! 
"# C = $
7(% 2 $ 2% +1)
225
 < 0, for any % & (0,1)       [A26] 
! 
"q 
C
=
1#$
15
> 0, for any $ % (0,1)         [A27] 
! 
"SW
C
=
8 # 50$ 3 # 72$ 2 +114$
225
> 0, for any $ % (0,1) .     [A28] 
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Figure 3. Differentials behaviour under alternative unionization structures with first moving unions 
  
 
 
iv) By comparing 
! 
SW MD
D
 in [32] against 
! 
SW MD
C
 in [34], we get: 
 
! 
SW MD
D
" SW MD
C
=
8#(4# 3 "10# 2 + 3# + 3)
25(3" 2#)2
> 0 , for any θ ∈ (0,1).    [A29] 
Q.E.D. 
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